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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT GOODWIN’S PAPER IS NOT ABOUT… 
 
At first sight, it might seem that, in “The Authority of Wikipedia,” Jean Goodwin is 
going to deal with a very useful, specific and not particularly philosophical matter, 
namely, whether we should consult Wikipedia at all. Goodwin incidentally remarks that, 
for teachers, it is a hot issue whether Wikipedia is an advisable pedagogical device. And 
certainly, in general, it may be interesting to know whether consulting Wikipedia is 
something sound to do if we are looking for information. Such a kind of concern should 
be placed in the realm of practical reason, as it amounts to try to determine the adequacy 
and efficiency of a certain means—i.e. consulting Wikipedia- to a certain end—i.e. 
getting information about different topics. For this concern, the target question would be 
“is consulting Wikipedia a good deal indeed?,” and the way to answer it would be an 
empirical research and the subsequent appraisal of its costs, risks and rewards as a source 
of information. But, this is not Goodwin’s question. 
There is a different concern that Goodwin’s paper seems to address. This time, it 
is a concern belonging to the realm of theoretical reason, as it amounts to try to determine 
the theoretical correctness of the information that Wikipedia provides. For it, the target 
question would be “is the information conveyed in Wikipedia right or (sufficiently) 
justified?” and the way to answer it would be, again, an empirical research determining 
the fulfillment of certain epistemological criteria—namely, criteria sanctioning the 
theoretical correctness of the information that Wikipedia provides. 
Remarkably, both determining the pragmatic adequacy of consulting Wikipedia as 
a source of information and determining the theoretical adequacy of the information that 
it provides can be said to be epistemological tasks. But the former is a matter of the 
correctness of the activity of consulting Wikipedia as a means to the specific end of 
having (sound, adequate) knowledge, whereas the latter is a matter of Wikipedia’s 
intrinsic quality as an “alleged” corpus of knowledge. However, none of these tasks is 
Goodwin’s main target –although, as I will argue in next section, the second one is part of 
Goodwin’s main goal. 
Rather, Goodwin says that she is going to “[…] consider a series of possible 
rationales for trusting Wikipedia, before proposing (her) own […]” (2009, p. 3). The 
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issue of the trustworthiness of Wikipedia can be seen as a matter of the theoretical 
adequacy of the beliefs that we acquire as a result of consulting it, but also of the 
pragmatic adequacy of consulting it as a source of information. But Goodwin is not 
primarily interested in considering whether Wikipedia is a good means for knowledge, 
nor does she try to establish the theoretical correctness of the information that Wikipedia 
conveys; at least, not directly. Rather, she aims at determining which criteria should we 
follow in order to determine, in turn, whether Wikipedia is trustable or not. And her 
contention will be that we “[…] trust Wikipedia on pragmatic, not on epistemic, grounds” 
(2009, p. 15). It is this main thesis what I would like to discuss in the following 
comments. 
 
2. A TWOFOLD AMBIGUITY IN GOODWIN’S SECONDARY GOAL 
 
There is a further remark to be made in order to properly characterize Goodwin’s project. 
For, at the beginning of her article, she also says: 
 
I consult Wikipedia. I am, further, no epistemic slouch; in fact I consider myself prudent in 
deciding what to credit. The purpose of this paper is to reconcile these two facts, by articulating 
the rationale which will make my trust in Wikipedia not only reasonable, but manifestly so. (2009, 
p. 1) 
 
As already said, Goodwin’s main goal is to provide an adequate rationale for 
determining whether Wikipedia is trustable or not. But, as a result, she will also try to 
show that Wikipedia is trustable indeed, so that she will be showing that trusting 
Wikipedia is “not only reasonable, but manifestly so.” However, in my view, the 
expression of the latter goal is ambiguous in at least two senses. 
In principle, Goodwin seems to aim at redeeming the rationality of those who trust 
the Free Encyclopaedia, like herself. But taking into account the above distinction 
between the theoretical and the pragmatic epistemic justification of trusting Wikipedia, I 
think we would have to ask, first, whether she is talking about their theoretical or their 
pragmatic rationality. For the former would be a matter of answering the question “are 
those who believe what Wikipedia says right in believing so?” whereas the latter would 
be a matter of answering the slightly different question “are those who consult Wikipedia 
right in doing so, provided that they aim at getting information?” 
I think this is an important distinction. For, on the one hand, it might be 
(theoretically) wrong from me to believe what Wikipedia says about, let’s say, 
dolphins—for example, because I think that Wikipedia is, in general, not very accurate—
while it is (pragmatically) right from me to consult Wikipedia for getting information 
about dolphins. That would be the case, for example, if it happens to be a good option to 
start my research about dolphins by consulting the corresponding entries, but just as a 
starting point for further research. If I do so, I am still trusting Wikipedia as a means for 
knowledge. Actually, I think that’s the way we should endorse its pedagogical use. 
And conversely, it might be (theoretically) right from me to believe what 
Wikipedia says about dolphins—for example, because I think that Wikipedia is mostly 
right—while it is (pragmatically) wrong from me to consult it. That would be the case if I 
have more accurate, more accessible, more fancy, more acknowledged, etc sources of 
information for my research. Arguably, this fact would partly explain the feeling that 
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there is something strange in a dolphin specialist seriously and instrumentally—that is, 
not for curiosity or fun, or for getting knowledge about Wikipedia itself, etc—consulting 
Wikipedia’s entries on dolphins. Goodwin herself seems to acknowledge this intuition by 
remarking that her consulting “Argumentation Theory” or “Informal Logic” was “out of 
curiosity” (2009, p. 8). Thus, even if we think that Wikipedia’s information is basically 
and mostly right, its generality and anti-expert style would tell against using it as a main 
academic source: specialists are supposed to use more “fancy” sources of knowledge… 
This is also something Goodwin seems to acknowledge when she mentions the despair 
with which many scholars see the possibility of consulting Wikipedia (2009, p. 2). 
On the other hand, we have to take into account that, whereas the concerns 
outlined in section 1 were about the theoretical and pragmatic adequacy of Wikipedia as a 
source of information, the ones we are considering now are about the theoretical and 
pragmatic rationality of those who consult Wikipedia or believe what it says. Certainly 
there is a sense in which both pairs of question happen to be the same, namely, the sense 
in which saying of a person that she is (theoretically or pragmatically) right in doing or 
believing that p means the same as saying that p is (theoretically or pragmatically) right. 
But, in principle, we should not grant the identity of both types of questions. For we may 
want to preserve the idea that it might happen to be (theoretically or pragmatically) 
wrong to look at Wikipedia as a source of information or to believe what it says, while it 
was (theoretically or pragmatically) right for someone to do so, as long as it coheres with 
her beliefs and/or desires. This idea amounts to acknowledge that, in a certain way, 
people may be wrong and still being rational. And vice versa: even if what Wikipedia 
says were true or if it were an utmost valuable source of information, there is a sense in 
which it would be wrong for a given subject to believe what it says or to consult it, 
namely, the sense in which it would be unreasonable from her to believe what it says or 
to consult it as a source of information if she distrust Wikipedia or unreasonably prefers 
another source of information. This is just to gather the idea that, sometimes, we happen 
to be right just by chance. 
Taking all this into account, I will contend that Goodwin’s goal of providing a 
rationale for trusting Wikipedia happens to be the goal of providing criteria for 
determining Wikipedia’s theoretical adequacy, i.e. criteria for determining whether what 
Wikipedia says can be taken to be (mostly) right. Following these criteria, she would try 
to show that Wikipedia is theoretically trustable indeed and, as a consequence, that those 
who consult Wikipedia are pragmatically right in doing so. In order to achieve the latter 
goal, however, Goodwin would have to presuppose not only that if a set of claims is 
theoretically correct, then those who believe them are theoretically rational, but also that 
if Wikipedia is such a set of theoretically correct claims, then it is pragmatically right to 
consult it as a source of information. But as argued above, these presuppositions are not 
warranted, so I would rather give up the analysis of the latter goal and focus just on the 
first and the second one1. 
                                                 
1 Actually, I think the following italics by Goodwin grant my decision: “I am going to presume here that 
reliance on Wikipedia is reasonable” (2009: 1). My guess is that Goodwin does not really aim at redeeming 
the reasonability of those who trust Wikipedia, but of Wikipedia itself (either as a means to the end of 
knowing, or as a body of “alleged” knowledge—i.e. as a set of claims). It may be difficult to admit that 
doing or believing something may be reasonable independently of its reasonability for someone. But, as 
argued above, we already endorse this distinction when we say that someone was right, but just by chance, 
or that she was wrong, but still rational. In my view, by saying that consulting Wikipedia is reasonable, 
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Now, regarding Goodwin’s primary goal of showing that the adequate criteria for 
determining the theoretical adequacy of Wikipedia are “pragmatic, not epistemic,” my 
main goal in this comments will be, in turn, to show that Goodwin is not really proposing 
“pragmatic” criteria for appraising Wikipedia’s information, but what we should call 
“second order theoretical criteria.” And as long as this contention might seem a merely 
linguistic matter, I would like to show that my proposed labels for “pragmatic,” 
“theoretic” and “epistemic” are able to grasp some distinctions that Goodwin’s aren’t. 
This is indeed a poor criticism, which is another way of saying that, in general, I’m very 
sympathetic to the ideas defended in “The Authority of Wikipedia.” 
 
3. EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY. REDUCTIONISM AND ANTI-
REDUCTIONISM 
 
Goodwin locates the question of the epistemological status of our trust in Wikipedia 
within the realm of the epistemology of testimony. Roughly, testimony epistemologists 
hold two main—and commonly held as incompatible—positions. For the reductionist—
Hume being a main withstander—in order to be justified in believing what others say we 
have to have (good) reasons for trusting them. On the contrary, anti-reductionists see 
testimony as self-justifying, that is, as something similar to other forms of direct 
judgment, like perception or memory, whose justification is rather a matter of not having 
reasons for disbelief. 
Thus, for the reductionist, the theoretical correctness of a belief acquired by 
testimony would finally rest on different reasons warranting that, in a particular case, the 
testimony given is likely true. On the contrary, for the anti-reductionist, the theoretical 
correctness of a belief acquired by testimony is a matter of the a priori acceptability of 
the idea that it is theoretically right to believe others’ assertions, unless there are good 
reasons to doubt them. Thus, no reasons would be needed in order to justify many of the 
beliefs that we acquire as a result of what others say to us. The a priori acceptability of 
such a thesis has been defended considering things like the constitutive conditions of 
asserting or the impossibility of massively attributing false beliefs. 
But it is important to take into account that both reductionists and anti-
reductionists discuss about the epistemic credentials of the beliefs that we acquire as a 
result of a very specific kind of testimony, namely, the case in which there is no salient 
reason to believe, nor to disbelieve, what the other says—like the testimony of a person 
that we meet in the middle of the street and, in being asked, tells us what time is it, or 
where is Boulevard Street. 
Main possible reasons for disbelieving are the evidence that the witness aims at 
deceiving us, or that she is committing a mistake. But it is also a good reason for 
disbelieving the fact that what the speaker says is too controversial to be accepted without 
                                                                                                                                                 
Goodwin is saying that, unless there are specific circumstances for particular individuals telling against it, 
we do well in trusting Wikipedia. In other words, I think Goodwin is making a claim about Wikipedia, she 
is saying something interesting about it, not about the peculiarities of those who consult it. Certainly, that 
means that what she would be saying about Wikipedia itself would be something quite close to what Locke 
called “secondary qualities,” like colors, which depend on the existence of humans: that x is green is a 
property of x, given how humans actually are. But secondary qualities are perfectly objective. 
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further explanations, or that it is too strange or complex, or just incompatible with many 
of our beliefs2. In this sense, Wikipedia does not seem to be the type of testimony we 
could accept without further questioning, for it provides specialized information in a 
systematic way. It claims are not like those of the person who tells us what time is it or 
where is Boulevard Street, for the complexity of its entries increases the probability that it 
contain, at least, some mistakes.  
Goodwin herself acknowledges that “Wikipedia is of course an extreme case. In 
less extreme cases, we often have good epistemic as well as pragmatic reasons for relying 
on what others tell us” (2009, p. 15). Consequently, as long as Wikipedia is not the 
standard type of testimony about which reductionists and anti-reductionists discuss, the 
fact that Goodwin (and me) thinks that we need reasons to turn our trust in Wikipedia 
into a theoretically right one does not amount to adopt a reductionist conception of the 
justifiability of the beliefs that we acquire by testimony.  
 
4. GOODWIN’S EVALUATION OF THREE POSSIBLE RATIONALES FOR 
TRUSTING WIKIPEDIA 
 
So, Wikipedia is not a standard case of testimony, and there is no possibility of a priori 
establishing Wikipedia’s trustworthiness or the rationality of the beliefs that we acquire 
as a result of consulting it. That is why Goodwin goes on to consider three types of 
rationales for determining the trustworthiness of the Free Encyclopaedia: the expertise of 
the individual author, the collective knowledge emerging from the sort of interactions that 
Wikipedia allows, and the success of past experiences of trust. 
 Regarding the possibility of justifying our trust in Wikipedia by considering the 
expertise of the individual authors, Goodwin says that: 
 
the anonymity or pseudonymity of Wikipedia editors prevents us from assessing their knowledge; 
what we do know of these editors does not make us confident; and the anti-expert culture of 
Wikipedia doesn’t give us reason to believe that these conditions will change. The knowledge of 
individual contributors does not appear to justify our practice of consulting Wikipedia. (2009, pp. 
4-5) 
 
I think this is plainly right: the interesting thing about the Wikipedia case is 
showing that, in dealing with the epistemological status of the beliefs that we acquire by 
testimony, we do not deal with the trustworthiness of speakers themselves. Rather, as 
Goodwin insists recalling Moran (2006), we deal with the trustworthiness of their 
particular communicative actions at a given occasion; and the speaker’s general 
trustworthiness as a person is just one reason among others for trusting what she says at 
that time. 
On the other hand, Goodwin notices, Wikipedia’s structure enables a very 
peculiar communicative practice, and she wonders whether the key of its trustworthiness 
could be, precisely, the characteristics of this practice, and particularly, the possibility for 
“the collective knowledge emerging from the sort of interactions that Wikipedia allows.” 
However, Goodwin says that “[…] it is not that Wikipedia fails to live up to the standards 
of “emergent social knowledge”; it is instead that these standards simply do not apply” 
                                                 
2 All these are reasons for disbelieving what someone says. Notice, on the other hand, that there are only 
two causes for a false testimony: that the speaker is wrong, or that she aims at deceiving us. 
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(2009, p. 7). For, as she argues, nothing in it grants the sort of Darwinian processes that 
would amount to a warrant for the outcome: the article that we finally read does not have 
to be the result of a progressive improvement of an original one or the survivor of an 
epistemological process. Rather, sometimes it is just “whatever the most recent editor 
decided to say and to leave alone” (2009, p. 6) or even a deceptive amalgam of 
incoherent opinions (2009, p. 7). 
Finally, Goodwin argues against what we can take to be the most general criterion 
for trusting something, namely, the fact that, so far, it has been (mostly) right. This is a 
very special rationale for trusting something. For its warrant is an instance of the 
inductive principle itself: in thinking that it makes sense to try to justify the 
trustworthiness of a source inductively—i.e. that the fact that it has been trustable so far 
is a good reason to continue trusting it—we are thinking of this trustworthiness as a 
contingent matter. In my view, that explains why Goodwin would not really manage to 
avoid a certain appeal to the inductive principle as a rationale for determining the 
trustworthiness of Wikipedia. I am going to argue for this in section 7, but I would like to 
finish this section just by questioning Goodwin’s reasons for dismissing the idea that a 
good rationale for trusting Wikipedia is whether “we’ve found it useful and reliable in the 
past” (Goodwin 2009, p. 7). 
Against this rationale Goodwin adduces, on the one hand, that we cannot use it 
because “as with many forms of testimony, it is difficult, or at least impractical, to test 
Wikipedia’s assertions against the facts.” But facts are not our only means for 
determining whether a given testimony is right: other testimonies already tested may also 
do the work. Actually, most of the times we test testimony not against the facts but 
against further testimonies, in a non-conclusive way. Arguably, that would be, precisely, 
the way out from the Socratic apparent paradox of expert testimony that Goodwin, 
mentioning Walton (1997), recalls: for it is not true that we cannot determine that a given 
subject is an expert unless we ourselves are experts too. Certainly, we cannot 
conclusively establish that someone knows what she says if we cannot determine that 
what she says is true, and if we ourselves are not experts, then we will not be able to tell 
by ourselves whether it is true indeed. But we can test the expert’s knowledge by asking 
others “alleged” experts about the same topic, and we can test her expertise by 
considering, for example, her credentials or the testimony of others about her very 
expertise. All this information would provide just an indirect and non-conclusive 
justification for believing in her testimony, but it may serve to justify believing so after 
all. 
Goodwin also dismisses induction because, in her view: 
 
there are many aspects of Wikipedia regarding which the more I find out about them, the less I 
trust. In many cases, however, these same features work pragmatically to encourage trust—and 
indeed, the more I find out about them, the more I trust. Take as an example the warning 
templates. Epistemically, every time I see a flag that the article I’m looking at is disputed, or that it 
lacks sources, or that it may be an advertisement—every time I see such a flag, my trust in the 
page, and in Wikipedia as a whole, should go down. By contrast, pragmatically speaking these 
warnings reconfirm that there is a community out there of people who care about quality. And the 
more prevalent the warnings are, the more I’m assured that the community is large, well-organized 
and working hard. (2009, p. 15) 
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But we can think of Wikipedia’s flags as qualified assertions: in that case, what 
we would have to check is whether the qualified assertions are correct, not whether plain 
assertions are correct. It is the qualified assertions what would count for determining the 
success of Wikipedia, not the bare assertions which, as the flags remark, should induce us 
to believe that there are many claims in Wikipedia that are wrong. In my view, what 
Wikipedia actually claims when it says “the article x needs further revision” is something 
like “x, but not in all its points.” 
Finally, Goodwin also says that we do not really use this rationale either. 
Certainly, we hardly ever “take a time out and explore whether Wikipedia’s details are 
correct” (Goodwin 2009, p. 7). But the truth is that we test Wikipedia indirectly all the 
time, for we are permanently acquainted with its increasing success as a website, and this 
counts as evidence in its favour: if Wikipedia tended to raise bad results, it is unlikely that 
so many people, and in such an increasing number, continued consulting it. That is also 
quite a sound reason for trusting contemporary science, in general: if current 
developments usually raised bad results, it is unlikely that so many resources continued 
being devoted to them and so many technical and expensive projects depended on them. 
Of course, this is just a defeasible reason, but a good defeasible reason after all. 
Actually, at this point Goodwin does not seem to argue against the inductive 
principle as a rationale; she is not saying that this is not a good criterion to test whether a 
given source is trustable or not. Rather, what she seems to say is that Wikipedia is 
trustable and, nevertheless, it does not meet this standard. However, I think Goodwin 
cannot be right that “the experience we do have of Wikipedia’s accuracy is often bad—or 
at least disappointing” (2007, p. 8). It cannot be the case that this is the general outcome 
of our use of Wikipedia. For, if it were, people would not massively use it as a source of 
information, and if they did, they would be irredeemably irrational and Wikipedia could 
not be said to be trustable. 
Besides, Goodwin says that “even if our experiences with Wikipedia were 
satisfactory, the “reductionist” approach cannot account for why it was legitimate for any 
of us to start consulting Wikipedia in the first place” (2007, p. 8). But I think this is also 
wrong: our first try with Wikipedia might have been done just as a mere try that, only 
after many satisfactory experiences, made us to come to believe that consulting 
Wikipedia was a good means to obtain information, or that Wikipedia’s information was 
mostly right. Our first try would have been irrational if we had trusted Wikipedia without 
further information about its trustworthiness. But many of us already had some 
information about Wikipedia’s success when we first consulted it. And most of the rest 
probably were not “epistemic slouch,” but just curious people. All this, with the 
corresponding qualification for each case… 
In my view, we do use an inductive rationale as a criterion for determining 
Wikipedia’s trustworthiness. But here, induction does not pivot on our individual 
experiences, but on all its users’ experiences. Moreover, according to this standard, 
Wikipedia seems to be trustable enough, and those believing in what it says who already 
know about its increasingly wild usage are rational in believing so. 
But Goodwin does not think this is a good way of justifying our trust in 
Wikipedia: 
 
None of these approaches makes consulting Wikipedia reasonable. At a minimum, they encourage 
us to be agnostic, since the information we’d need to assure ourselves is unavailable; in the worst 
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case, they encourage us to caution and distrust. Either trust in Wikipedia is unjustified, or it is 
justified on some other ground. But the premise of this paper is that we are right to consult 
Wikipedia. (2009, p. 9) 
 
5. GOODWIN’S JUSTIFICATION OF WIKIPEDIA’S TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
According to Goodwin: 
 
The startling size of and activity around Wikipedia demonstrates that those who are creating it are 
deeply committed to the project of providing me with knowledge (indeed, with the sum of all 
knowledge). Relying on their conspicuous passion, it is reasonable for me to trust the Wikipedians, 
and consult Wikipedia. (2009, p. 11) 
  
Maybe “demonstrates” is a little too big world, but at any rate, Goodwin thinks 
that the qualities of Wikipedians’ activity are the right standard to test the trustworthiness 
of Wikipedia. And she contends that, according to it, Wikipedia happens to be trustable 
indeed. In addition, she says that this is a pragmatic rationale for trusting something, as it 
leaves “aside consideration of what Wikipedians know, and examine instead what 
Wikipedians do.” (2009, p. 10). 
I think it might be a good idea to replace the issue of the trustworthiness of 
testimony from the question of what does the witness know to the question of what does 
she do. After all, testimonies may be false not only because witnesses do not always 
know what they say, but also because sometimes they aim at deceiving us. But 
Goodwin’s point is deeper than this: what she says is that we should focus on the way 
witnesses present the information that they provide, not only as a way to test whether 
their intentions are pure (i.e. that they do not want to deceive us), but also as a way to test 
whether they will be able to accomplish such intentions (i.e. that they will be able to 
avoid mistakes). 
Thus, Goodwin remarks that Wikipedians have a “conspicuous dedication to their 
project,” which is to provide us with “the sum of all knowledge” (2009, p. 11). And that 
would give us a prima facie reason to trust their intentions. However, she notices, being 
faithful to such an ideal may fail to be a reason to trust Wikipedia if its standards for 
acknowledging something as proper knowledge do not really qualify. Because of that, her 
second step is to test whether Wikipedians have an acceptable conception of knowledge. 
That is what she calls “the definition concern.” And she concludes that even though she 
cannot tell whether Wikipedians and herself are “in full agreement” about a definition of 
knowledge, she thinks that this is not necessary because “the massive effort that 
Wikipedians have conspicuously invested in policy-making gives me confidence that 
they share my concern for definition; it also suggests that whatever definition they have 
(currently) come up with is likely to be sophisticated and well-grounded” (2009, p. 12)3.  
                                                 
3 At this point, the question of whether we are considering Wikipedia’s trustworthiness or Goodwin’s 
rationality in trusting it becomes relevant: maybe she is not right in being confident just with that 
“warranties.” In that case, the fact that this is enough for her would turn rational her trusting Wikipedia; 
yet, Wikipedia would fail to be trustable in itself. Anyway, I suppose Goodwin is not actually saying that 
Wikipedians’ activity makes her confident that they share her concern about the definition of knowledge, 
but rather that we should be confident. 
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Yet, having adequate standards to determine what counts as knowledge is not 
enough to trust what Wikipedians say. For still remains open the question of whether they 
actually meet these standards. But Goodwin thinks that  
 
Wikipedians have developed elaborate methods for policing contributions to the site from those 
who don’t share their commitment to provide knowledge to the world” (2009, p. 13). 
 
Moreover, according to Goodwin, Wikipedians are permanently working to overcome 
any pragmatic doubts that those consulting Wikipedia might rise,  
 
by developing policies, practices, institutions, and technologies which function conspicuously to 
assure me that what I will encounter in a Wikipedia article is the work of people passionate about 
giving me free access to the sum of all knowledge (2009, p. 15).  
 
To sum up, Goodwin says: 
 
I do not have much idea of whether any particular Wikipedian knows anything. Nor do I generally 
bother to check how accurate the information in an article is. However I do know—because they 
insistently communicate it to me--what Wikipedians are trying to do. They tell me that “we love 
accumulating, ordering, structuring, and making freely available what knowledge we have in the 
form of an encyclopaedia of unprecedented size” (Wikipedia: WikiLove 2009). I can learn about 
the policies, practices, institutions and technologies Wikipedians have invented to insure that they 
achieve their goal, because they are not only transparent but conspicuously signalled to anyone 
visiting the site. Confident that the Wikipedians are committed to providing me with the sum of all 
knowledge, I have good reasons to consult the site. I trust Wikipedia on pragmatic, not on 
epistemic, grounds. (2009, p. 15) 
 
6. ARE GOODWIN’S CRITERIA PRAGMATIC INDEED? 
 
According to Goodwin, there would be a contrast between pragmatic and epistemic 
grounds for trusting something. She contends that an epistemic approach to the question 
of trustworthiness will “proceed directly to knowledge, assessing the expertise of the 
author(s) or the reliability of the site” (2009, p. 15), whereas the approach that she 
endorses proceeds indirectly, not by assessing “the expertise but the trustworthiness of 
the authors” (2009, p. 15), considering whether we are “licensed to rely on them to take 
care in giving (knowledge) to (us).” In this section, I would like to argue that we should 
not call such an approach “pragmatic” but, at it best, “second order theoretical,” for it 
amounts to rely on second order standards to theoretically justify the beliefs that we 
acquire as a result of consulting a given source. So, let me first propose a general 
conception of theoretical and pragmatic justification. 
I think of the theoretical justification of a claim or belief as a matter of its 
correctness as a description of how things are. Contrastingly, the pragmatic justification 
of something (including a claim or a belief) would be a matter of its adequacy as a means 
to an end. Regarding their theoretical justification, the main problem with those beliefs 
that we acquire as a result of what others testify in standard cases is that they do not argue 
for it, i.e. that they do not provide reasons showing their claims to be correct. For if they 
did, we would be in a position to solve both the problem of whether it is theoretically 
rational for a given individual to believe what others says, and also the problem of 
whether what others says is (sufficiently) justified: the former would be a matter of the 
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coherence of the individual’s appraisal of the reasons that the speaker offered for her 
claims, whereas the latter would be a matter of their actual goodness. 
But, as it happens with standard cases of testimony, Wikipedia does not offer 
reasons for its claims; its entries are not argumentative, but expositive. However, we may 
still be theoretically justified in believing what it says. It is by dealing with this 
possibility that the question of the epistemological status of the beliefs that we acquire by 
consulting Wikipedia turns into the question of which reasons would grant its 
trustworthiness, and whether Wikipedia meets them. Goodwin’s answer is to look at what 
Wikipedians do. And she says that this amounts to seek for a pragmatic account of 
Wikipedia’s trustworthiness. 
 
In ordinary life, we do trust others—and not always, or perhaps even often, on epistemic grounds. 
When I deposit my pay check in my bank, for example, I am not relying on my banker’s 
knowledgeability to get it back to me with interest. After all, there’s been plenty of evidence 
recently that at least some bankers are foolish. Instead, I am relying on my bank’s contract with 
me, on the court system which allows me to enforce that contract, and on the federal guarantee 
which will hold me harmless if my bank collapses. Let’s call this kind of reliance “pragmatic,” 
since it involves assessments of what agents (my bank, the court system, the federal government) 
can be relied upon to do. (2009, p. 10) 
 
But, does trusting our bank on these grounds really have the same type of 
justification as it has trusting Wikipedia because of what Wikipedians do? Trusting our 
bank is a good means to safely guard our money because there is a convenient balance 
between its costs, its risks and its rewards. Thus, I would say that we are pragmatically 
justified in trusting banks; they are a good deal for guarding money. But I wouldn’t say 
that we are theoretically justified in believing bankers when they pretend that our money 
is safe in their hands. This belief might fail to be justified if we take into account that 
“there’s been plenty of evidence recently that at least some bankers are foolish.” 
What about Wikipedia? In my proposed terminology, the sort of justification of 
Wikipedia’s trustworthiness that Goodwin is looking for is not pragmatic but theoretical: 
she does not want to show that it is a good deal to consult Wikipedia when we want to 
know something; rather, she wants to show that Wikipedia’s information is (likely) 
mostly right. Thus, when she proposes to look at what Wikipedians do she is rather 
offering a rationale for believing what they say. Call it as you wish, but there is a 
difference here between both ways of being justified in trusting something or someone: if 
we trust a plumber because he has a reputation, we are taking his reputation as a good 
reason to believe that he will probably do it well; but if we trust him just because he is 
offering a two years guarantee, we are not taking his offer as a reason to believe that he 
will do it well, but as a reason for preferring him to do the work, provided that other 
conditions do also hold. I think that, in order to grasp this difference between two ways of 
being right in trusting, we could say that, in the former case we trust on theoretical 
reasons, while in the latter, we trust on pragmatic ones. 
Accordingly, we could say that Goodwin is proposing theoretical rationales for 
trusting Wikipedia, or if you prefer, that she is trying to determine the theoretical 
adequacy of the information that it provides. But not its pragmatic adequacy as a source 
of knowledge: for doing this, she would rather have to take into account its costs, risks 
and rewards as a means to the end of getting information, so that things like, for example, 
the fact that it is for free, that you need internet access or that it has a bad press in 
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technical circles—by contrast with the Encyclopedia Britannica—would become 
relevant. 
Yet, as mentioned above, Wikipedia’s entries are not argumentative, so that we 
cannot establish their theoretical adequacy by appraising the reasons that Wikipedians 
offer for showing their claims to be correct. That is why we have to appeal to criteria that 
are not reasons showing the corresponding claims to be (theoretically) correct, but 
reasons to think that these claims might be so. In my view, we should call this type of 
criteria “second order theoretical”: they are not reasons directly showing Wikipedia’s 
claims to be correct, but rather reasons showing our beliefs in what Wikipedia says to be 
correct. 
Let me illustrate this point by considering Goodwin’s proposed criteria for 
assessing expertise opinion. She says that, if we adopt the pragmatic rationale for trusting 
testimony that she is proposing, we “should encourage students to be less concerned 
about figuring out who the "real" expert is, for example on climate change, and to pay 
more attention to the assurances that the competing experts are offering us. Critical 
questions for testing an appeal to expert authority might include: 
 
Why is this person offering you their view? 
Can you verify her intentions? 
What does she have to lose if she turns out to be wrong? 
Are there reliable enforcement mechanisms to ensure she will endure these penalties? (Goodwin 
2009, p. 16) 
 
But, as I see it, these questions are just attempts at dismissing one of the main 
reasons for not believing what another person says, namely, that she wanted to deceive 
us: by raising them, we are testing her sincerity. It is sensible to suppose that apart from 
testing her sincerity, we would also have to check whether the witness could be mistaken: 
for she might be a nice person but completely wrong… But then we are right back to the 
most traditional account of the justification for believing testimony. And I think Goodwin 
is right in saying that this traditional account does not work in the case of Wikipedia, 





There is a further reading of Goodwin’s paper. At a certain point, she seems to suggest 
that her “pragmatic” proposal would be able to shed light to the reductionist/anti-
reductionist debate 
 
As Richard Moran has argued in an important essay (2006), both reductionist and anti-reductionist 
accounts tend to ignore the act of testimony itself, treating it as merely a convenient instrument for 
detecting knowledge in other people’s heads. If we had another method for finding out what others 
believe—e.g., an epistemometer—we might be able to dispose of testimony entirely. But that 
seems odd. Moran proposes instead that we must attend to what speakers are doing when they 
testify: namely, taking responsibility for the truth of what they are saying. He is urging, in other 
words, what I have here called a pragmatic rationale for trust. As I have argued, a pragmatic 
approach works much better than an epistemic approach in accounting for our ordinary practice of 
consulting Wikipedia. In Fred Kauffeld’s terms (2003), the entire “speech act” that is Wikipedia—
not just the page of an article, but the conspicuous evidence the site provides of all of the 
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Wikipedians’ efforts—licenses a presumption that what I find there is worth consulting. This 
suggests that those pursuing projects in the philosophy of testimony should be paying more 
attention to the diverse and complex ways speakers can design their talk to provide auditors with 
reasons to trust. (2009, p. 16) 
 
But how is this supposed to give a clue to solve the question of whether testimony 
is a priori trustable, which is the point of the discussion between reductionists and anti-
reductionists? Certainly, the way a certain performance has been displayed gives us clues 
to believe/disbelieve that it is trustable. Such a rationale is, as argued above, a second 
order theoretical rationale for believing: even if we cannot know directly whether the 
speaker is right, we can still have theoretical reasons for believing her, namely, reasons 
showing our belief that the speaker is right to be correct. Among these reasons, we can 
take into account different features of her performance, including the way she presents 
herself. This is what Aristotle already called the ethic aspect of discourse. But good 
rhetoricians are supposed to be able to make us believe in their sincerity, expertise, etc, 
and taking this into account, we should be clear that, at their best, appearances are not 
enough, as Plato used to warn us against the sophists. 
The trustworthiness of Wikipedia is not grounded on rhetorical but on 
epistemological criteria: the ethos of the speaker does not warrant our trusting her 
regardless of further considerations. People who behave as trustable people do normally 
speak the truth. But they may also be good deceivers, and we know it. We are not 
necessarily committed to believe people who look trustable. There is just an inductive 
rationale for trusting what looks trustable, neither a necessary, nor an a priori one. 
In my view, we are right in trusting Wikipedia because there is an increasingly 
huge number of other people who use it as a source of “general” information. But if we 
came to know that we all were wrong about Wikipedia, continuing believing in what it 
says would be irredeemably irrational, no matter how trustable it seemed to us: the fact 
that Wikipedia looks trustable is just some evidence in its favor, an evidence grounded on 
an inductive principle such as “when people guard its claims, meet such and such 
standards, appear in such and such way, etc they frequently tell the truth.” 
“Perceiving” or “remembering” are a priori trustable sources of information: if 
we know that a given subject has perceived or remembered that p, then we already know 
that p is true. Another type of a priori trustable source of information is that of codes of 
rules constitutively determining what is right or wrong from one or another point of 
view—like, for example, a legal system or the rules of a game. As a source of 
information about what is right or wrong, a code of rules is a priori trustable because 
there are only extrinsic ways of doubting whether it is wrong to do what the rules forbid: 
namely, either doubting whether we are facing the “real” code, or considering a different 
kind of wrongness, i.e. a wrongness determined by different rules4. An a priori 
justification of the trustworthiness of a given source is a justification that proceeds 
through a warrant that it is an a priori truth, such as “if someone has seen that p, then the 
belief that p is correct.” 
I do not have a position regarding the reductionist/anti-reductionist debate; that is, 
I am not sure whether there is an a priori warrant showing our believing in what a 
witness says to be correct. But I think that, in any case, it is a contingent one: witnesses 
                                                 
4 That’s what we do when we wonder things like “is it right to do what the Law says we have to do?” 
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are not necessarily trustable—our eyes or our memory aren’t either, by the way. A 
necessarily trustable source of information is, for example, the Bible or the Pope, 
according to the believer. For them, it is not an a priori truth that if the Bible or the Pope 
says that p, then the belief that p is correct, as this is something that they came to know 
after God, allegedly, told them. Yet, they cannot disbelieve what it says; for them, it is 
impossible that this warrant is wrong. But Wikipedia is not the Bible. Actually, I think 
the best thing about this great project is that it has shown us that authority is not the 
ultimate reason to trust. 
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